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INTRODUCTION 
Every ten years, states are required to draw new electoral districts. 
State legislatures across the country draw new district lines based on 
many competing considerations, including race. The use of race in 
redistricting is a contentious issue and poses many potential difficulties 
for would-be map drawers. Redistricting plans must not rely on too 
much race-based line drawing to avoid violating the Equal Protection 
Clause in the Constitution,1 while at the same time also must rely on 
enough to meet the requirements of the Voting Rights Act2 (VRA). 
State plans are regularly challenged in court, with plaintiffs alleging the 
state failed to strike the appropriate balance between too much and too 
little use of race as a redistricting criteria. These challenges are a 
daunting task for courts to resolve because they require careful 
consideration of the often competing concerns of potential vote 
dilution of minority voting strength, the relationship between politics 
and race, the level of deference owed to state legislatures, the reliance 
state legislatures place on the courts’ decisions, and how difficult it will 
be for courts to evaluate future redistricting challenges. 
Copyright © 2017 Alex Dietz. 
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1.  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
2.  52 U.S.C. § 10101. 
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In McCrory v. Harris,3 the Supreme Court must decide whether the 
redistricting plan for North Carolina’s first and twelfth congressional 
districts, CD1 and CD12, violates the Equal Protection Clause. The 
First and Twelfth Congressional Districts in North Carolina have been 
the subjects of numerous prior Supreme Court rulings regarding the 
use of race in redistricting.4 Faced with another challenge to North 
Carolina’s CD1 and CD12, the Court must determine that either the 
North Carolina legislature struck the appropriate balance while relying 
on race as a redistricting criterion, or produced a map with 
impermissibly racially gerrymandered districts. This challenge is further 
complicated by the fact that there is similar litigation currently in 
progress in the North Carolina state court system that has resulted in 
the opposite findings the lower court arrived at in McCrory.5 
This Commentary argues that the Supreme Court should affirm 
that both North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12 are the result of 
impermissible racial gerrymanders in violation of the Equal Protection 
Clause. The procedural concerns raised by North Carolina concerning 
the state court litigation do not justify any change to the Court’s 
standard of review in this case. The Court should find both CD1 and 
CD12 to be impermissible racial gerrymanders because the district 
court’s findings that race predominated over traditional redistricting 
criteria, and the district court’s conclusion that such predominance fails 
strict scrutiny analysis, were not clear error. 
I.  FACTS 
Following the 2010 decennial census, the North Carolina General 
Assembly began drawing new congressional districts to adjust for 
changes in population.6 The State House and Senate established 
redistricting committees, which together were responsible for 
preparing a plan for new congressional districts.7 The Chairmen of 
these committees, Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis, hired Dr. 
 
 3.  136 S. Ct. 2512 (2016). 
 4.  See Brief for Appellants at 5, McCrory v. Harris, NO. 15-1262 (U.S. Sept. 12, 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Appellants] (“[T]his case marks the fifth occasion on which this Court has 
considered racial gerrymandering challenges to North Carolina’s First and/or Twelfth Districts.”). 
 5.  See Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404, 410–11 (N.C. 2015) petition for cert. filed (U.S. 
June 30, 2016) (No. 16-24) (“[W]e affirm the ruling of the three-judge panel that the predominant 
factors in their creation were the traditional and permissible redistricting principles.”). 
 6.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 8. 
 7.  Id. 
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Thomas Hofeller to design and draw the 2011 congressional plan.8 The 
Chairmen provided the sole instructions for Dr. Hofeller about how to 
redesign the electoral districts.9 The general priorities were to comply 
with the one-person, one-vote requirement10 and to draw maps to favor 
Republican candidates.11 For CD1, the specific instructions were to 
draw CD1 “with a black voting-age population in excess of 50 percent 
because of the Strickland case.”12 For CD12, the instructions were to 
make CD12 a more Democratic district to “help Republican candidates 
in the surrounding districts,”13 and not to “use race in any form except 
perhaps with regard to Guilford County.”14 
When the plan was made public, Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis stated that they had intentionally made CD1 a 
majority-minority district, and also stated that “because of the presence 
of Guilford County in the Twelfth District, we have drawn our 
proposed Twelfth District at a black voting age level that is above the 
percentage of black voting age population found in the current Twelfth 
District.”15 The plan raised the black voting age population (BVAP) in 
CD1 from 47.76% to 52.65% and raised the BVAP in CD12 from 
43.77% to 50.66%.16 The redistricting plan, including the new CD1 and 
CD12 districts, was approved by the North Carolina legislature, 
submitted to the DOJ for preclearance under section 5 of the VRA, 
and was approved.17 
The new maps faced almost immediate challenge in state court as 
illegal racial gerrymanders.18 Multiple plaintiffs, including the North 
Carolina Conference of Branches of the NAACP, challenged the plan, 
and all of the challenges were consolidated in to one case.19 That case, 
Dickson v. Rucho,20 has gone through the entirety of the state court 
 
 8.  Id. at 9. 
 9.  Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 607 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
 10.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 6, at 10. The 2010 census revealed that CD1 was 
extremely under populated. Id. 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 613. 
 13.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 10. 
 14.  Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 619 (emphasis in original). 
 15.  Id. at 608 (quotation marks and citations omitted). 
 16.  Brief for Appellees at 2, McCrory v. Harris, NO. 15-1262 (U.S. Oct. 12, 2016) 
[hereinafter Brief for Appellees]. 
 17.  Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 608–09. 
 18.  Id. at 609. 
 19.  Id. 
 20.  781 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 2015) petition for cert. filed (U.S. June 30, 2016) (No. 16-24). 
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system and was also heard by the Supreme Court.21 In Dickson, the 
state trial court below found that CD1 had been drawn using race as 
the predominant factor, but that it passed strict scrutiny, and that CD12 
had not been drawn using race as the predominant factor, therefore 
concluding that neither district was an impermissible gerrymander.22 
The North Carolina Supreme Court upheld the district court’s findings, 
and then reaffirmed after the United States Supreme Court vacated 
that result.23 The plaintiffs in the state court litigation have petitioned 
the United States Supreme Court again for certiorari,24 but the fate of 
the state court litigation is likely to be bound up in the outcome of 
McCrory. 
McCrory began when Appellees David Harris and Christine 
Bowser,25 registered voters in CD1 and CD12, respectively, claimed 
that North Carolina used the VRA as a pretext to unconstitutionally 
dilute minority voting strength by packing African Americans in to 
CD1 and CD12.26 A three-judge panel presided over the trial, during 
which substantial testimony was heard from Dr. Hofeller, the 
Congressman representing CD1, the former Congressman representing 
CD12, and from expert witnesses for each side.27 
During his testimony, Dr. Hofeller admitted to implementing a 
racial floor of fifty percent plus one person for CD1, and that 
sometimes, while adding voters to CD1, “it wasn’t possible to adhere to 
some of the traditional redistricting criteria.”28 Hofeller also testified 
that while drawing CD12, he only viewed political data,29 but that “in 
order to be cautious and draw a plan that would pass muster under the 
Voting Rights Act, it was decided to reunite the black community in 
Guilford County into the Twelfth.”30 
 
 
 21.  Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 609. 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  Id. The result was vacated so that the North Carolina Supreme Court could further 
consider the matter in light of new doctrine in Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 
1257 (2015). 
 24.  Petition for Writ of Certiorari, Dickson v. Rucho, 781 S.E.2d 404 (N.C. 2015) (No. 14-
839). 
 25.  Neither was a plaintiff in the state court litigation. Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 609. In fact, 
they did not even know the state case existed at the time they filed suit. Brief for Appellees, supra 
note 16, at 52. 
 26.  Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 609. 
 27.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 15. 
 28.  Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 611–12. 
 29.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 10. 
 30.  Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 619. 
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The panel also heard testimony from Congressman G.K. 
Butterfield, representative of CD1, and former Congressman Mel Watt, 
who formerly represented CD12.31 Both representatives had 
tremendous success as the African-American preferred candidate in 
their respective districts prior to the implementation of the 2011 plan, 
even though neither district was a majority-minority district.32 Former 
Congressman Watt also testified that Senator Rucho explicitly told him 
that the goal for CD12 was to increase the BVAP “up to over 50 percent 
to comply with the Voting Rights Law.”33 
Both Appellants and Appellees offered expert reports and 
testimony during the trial. Appellants offered reports prepared for the 
State legislature concluding that racially polarized voting occurs in 
North Carolina, and specifically in the counties and districts in and 
around CD1.34 Appellees produced expert reports based on voter 
registration data in support of the idea that race best explains the line 
drawing in the 2011 version of CD12.35 
Following the trial, the district court produced a lengthy opinion 
holding North Carolina’s 2011 redistricting plan unconstitutional for 
violating the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment 
and ordered the drawing of new districts.36 After denying a motion to 
stay the district court’s order pending appeal,37 the Supreme Court 
noted probable jurisdiction.38 
II.  LEGAL BACKGROUND 
Both procedural law concerning collateral estoppel and the 
standard of review, and substantive law concerning the Equal 
Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment and the VRA, are at 
issue in McCrory. 
 
 31.  Id. at 628 (Cogburn, J., concurring). 
 32.  Id. at 606–07. 
 33.  Id. at 617 (quotation marks omitted). Senator Rucho was present at the trial, but was 
never called to testify to rebut this contention. Id. at 617–18. 
 34.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 9. 
 35.  See Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 620 (“This conclusion is further supported circumstantially 
by the findings of the plaintiffs’ experts, Drs. Peterson and Ansolabehere.”). 
 36.  Id. at 604. 
 37.  McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 1001, 1001 (2016). 
 38.  McCrory v. Harris, 136 S. Ct. 2512, 2512 (2016). 
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A.  Procedural Law: Collateral Estoppel and the Standard of Review 
The doctrine of collateral estoppel prohibits relitigation of issues 
that have been decided in certain cases.39 Specifically, any issue of fact 
or law decided in one case precludes the parties to that case from 
relitigating the issue.40 In general, this preclusive effect applies to issues 
decided in either federal or state courts.41 Collateral estoppel may not 
be claimed against a party that did not have a “full and fair opportunity 
to litigate that issue in the earlier case.”42 
Review of a lower court’s factual findings is governed by Rule 52(a) 
of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.43 A reviewing court must not 
set aside factual findings unless they are “clearly erroneous.”44 This 
means that the reviewing court may not set aside factual findings “[i]f 
the district court’s account of the evidence is plausible . . . even though 
convinced that had it been sitting as the trier of fact it would have 
weighed the evidence differently.”45 This “clearly erroneous” standard 
of review applies in cases concerning a finding of racial predominance, 
even though obtaining a finding of racial predominance requires 
meeting a demanding standard at the trial court level.46 
B.  Substantive Law: The Equal Protection Clause and the VRA 
The Fourteenth Amendment was created with the goal of 
eliminating racial discrimination emanating from official state 
sources.47 When challenged in court, racially gerrymandered 
redistricting plans are constitutionally suspect and subject to strict 
scrutiny, a court’s toughest standard of constitutional review.48 A 
district is racially gerrymandered if race is the predominant factor 
motivating the placement of district lines.49 Proving that race was the 
predominant factor in a redistricting plan requires showing “the 
legislature subordinated traditional race-neutral districting principles . 
 
 39.  Allen v. McCurry, 449 U.S. 90, 94 (1980). 
 40.  Id. 
 41.  Id. at 95. 
 42.  Id. (quotation marks omitted). 
 43.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
 44.  Id. 52(a)(6). 
 45.  Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 573–74 (1985). 
 46.  Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 241–42 (2001). 
 47.  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 907 (1996) (citations omitted). 
 48.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 920 (1995). 
 49.  Id. at 916. 
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. . to racial considerations.”50 The burden of proving racial 
predominance may be satisfied through either “circumstantial evidence 
of a district’s shape and demographics or more direct evidence going to 
legislative purpose.”51 This is often easier said than done, especially in 
cases where “majority-minority districts (or the approximate 
equivalent) are at issue and where racial identification correlates highly 
with political affiliation.”52 The Supreme Court faced such a case in 
Easley v. Cromartie,53 wherein the Court found that “[t]he evidence 
taken together . . . does not show that racial considerations 
predominated.”54 The Court attempted to clarify the standard by 
stating that “[i]n a case such as this one . . . the party attacking the 
legislatively drawn boundaries must show at the least that the 
legislature could have achieved its legitimate political objectives in 
alternative ways that are comparably consistent with traditional 
districting principles.”55 
Once a districting plan is held to be a racial gerrymander under the 
racial predominance standard, it becomes subject to strict scrutiny.56 
Proving that the redistricting legislation is narrowly tailored to a 
compelling interest is the only way for the state to satisfy strict 
scrutiny.57 The Supreme Court has indicated that a racially 
gerrymandered districting plan can pass strict scrutiny when the 
challenged district is “reasonably necessary under the constitutional 
reading and application” of federal law.58 Furthermore, a racially 
gerrymandered plan may also pass strict scrutiny if a state has “a strong 
basis in evidence to use racial classifications in order to comply with a 
statute,” meaning “good reasons to believe such use is required, even if 
a court does not find that the actions were necessary.”59 The Supreme 
Court has assumed, but not decided, that a state’s interest in complying 
with the VRA could justify a racially gerrymandered districting plan.60 
When analyzing a VRA claim, the Court looks at whether the plan 
 
 50.  Id. 
 51.  Id. 
 52.  Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001). 
 53.  Id. 
 54.  Id. at 257. 
 55.  Id. at 258. 
 56.  Miller, 515 U.S. at 920. 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  Id. at 921. 
 59.  Ala. Legis. Black Caucus v. Alabama, 135 S. Ct. 1257, 1274 (2015) (emphasis in original) 
(quotation marks omitted). 
 60.  Shaw v. Hunt, 517 U.S. 899, 915 (1996). 
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racially placed voters in certain districts to comply with section 2 
prohibitions against vote dilution.61 
A section 2 violation is determined by a two-part totality of the 
circumstances test.62 The first part of the test requires meeting a set of 
preconditions, now known as the Gingles factors.63 The preconditions 
are that a minority group must be sufficiently large, politically cohesive, 
and a white majority must vote sufficiently as a bloc to enable it to 
usually defeat the minority’s preferred candidate.64 Failure to meet any 
one of the preconditions is fatal to the section 2 claim.65 If the reviewing 
court finds that the VRA claims would have failed if brought against 
the previous district map, it will find that a new racially gerrymandered 
map does not survive strict scrutiny.66 This is what happened in the 
federal district court. 
III.  HOLDING 
The federal district court held that CD1 and CD12 in the North 
Carolina 2011 redistricting plan violated the Fourteenth Amendment 
because race was the predominant consideration in both districts and 
the districts did not pass strict scrutiny.67 The court found that there was 
no need for an alternative map to prove racial predominance because 
the direct and circumstantial evidence in the case, taken as a whole, 
clearly showed racial predominance.68 Assuming arguendo that a 
state’s interest in complying with the VRA may justify racial 
gerrymandering, the court also found that there was no strong basis in 
evidence for concluding that the racially gerrymandered districts at 
issue must be majority-minority districts for North Carolina to be in 
compliance with the VRA.69 
 
 61.  Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 605 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
 62.  Thornburg v. Gingles, 478 U.S. 30, 43–46 (1986). 
 63.  Id. at 50–51. 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. See also Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 24 (2009) (“Majority-minority districts are 
only required if all three Gingles factors are met and if § 2 applies based on a totality of the 
circumstances.”). 
 66.  See, e.g., Shaw v. Hunt 517 U.S. 899, 918 (1996) (“We hold, therefore, that District 12 is 
not narrowly tailored to the State’s asserted interest in complying with § 2 of the Voting Rights 
Act.”). 
 67.  Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 604 (M.D.N.C. 2016). It is important to note 
that the district court’s opinion does not address the procedural issue of collateral estoppel 
because that claim was rejected through an order in response to North Carolina’s pretrial motion 
on the issue and was not raised during trial. Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 51. 
 68.  Harris, 159 F. Supp. 3d at 621. 
 69.  Id. at 622–23. 
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IV.  ARGUMENTS 
The parties in McCrory disagree on three major questions. First, 
does collateral estoppel bar the Appellees’ claims or impact the 
standard of review? Second, was race the predominant factor in the 
drawing of district lines in North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12? Third, if 
race was the predominant factor, does its use survive strict scrutiny? 
A. Does Collateral Estoppel Bar the Appellees’ Claims or Impact the 
Standard of Review? 
Appellants argue that the claims against North Carolina’s 
redistricting plan should have been barred from federal court because 
they were already decided in state court at the time the suit was filed.70 
Appellants asserts that Appellees are members of the North Carolina 
NAACP, and that the North Carolina NAACP’s suit in state court bars 
members like Appellees from relitigating the issues in federal court.71 
Even if Appellees’ claims are not precluded, Appellants argue that 
fairness requires that the prior state court findings be considered when 
reviewing the decision of the federal district court.72  
In response, Appellees argue that the district court rejected the 
collateral estoppel argument before trial, and that Appellees are not 
members of the North Carolina NAACP, making claim preclusion 
inapplicable to them.73 Appellees further argue that Appellants did not 
properly preserve the issue of collateral estoppel for appeal, and 
therefore it would be improper for the Court to review it or allow it to 
affect their ruling.74 
B.  Did the District Court Commit Clear Error by Holding that Race 
was the Predominant Factor in Drawing the District Lines for 
North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12? 
Appellants argue that neither CD1 nor CD12 was designed with 
race as the predominant factor.75 Appellants’ main legal claim, that the 
evidence was insufficient to prove racial predominance, relies heavily 
on the argument that the “alternative ways” requirement outlined in 
Easley  requires  an  alternative  district  map  in  all  redistricting  cases  
 
 70.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 19. 
 71.  Id. at 19–20. 
 72.  Id. at 22–23. 
 73.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 51–52. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 17–18. 
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where a plaintiff claims districts are impermissible racial 
gerrymanders.76 
For CD1, Appellants claim that the lower court clearly erred in 
finding racial predominance because the record did not show that 
traditional redistricting principles were disregarded in order to 
prioritize race.77 Appellants further claim that Appellees failed to show 
racial predominance because they did not provide a required 
alternative district map that met the legislature’s concerns about 
complying with the VRA without relying on race as a predominant 
factor.78 
For CD12, Appellants claim that the lower court clearly erred in 
finding racial predominance because CD12 was created with political 
affiliation as the predominant factor, rather than race.79 Appellants rely 
on the strong correlation between race and political affiliation to 
explain how CD12 became a majority-minority district.80 According to 
Appellants, the instructions given to and followed by Dr. Hofeller 
demonstrate that political affiliation was the primary concern.81 
Furthermore, Appellants claim the public statement made by 
Representative Lewis and Senator Rucho—that CD12 was created as 
a majority-minority district because of the presence of Guilford 
County—merely describes the results of the redistricting plan, rather 
than the motives for its creation.82 Appellants also deny that Senator 
Rucho ever said he needed to ramp up the BVAP in CD12, and argue 
that even if such a comment had been made, the instructions given to 
Dr. Hofeller did not include a mandatory racial percentage.83 
Additionally, Appellants argue that Appellees’ expert witness 
testimony and reports should be disregarded because they rely on voter 
registration data, rather than on actual voting results.84 Finally, 
Appellants argue that Appellees’ failure to provide an alternative map 
that satisfied the legislatures’ legally permissible political goals without 
 
 76.  Id. at 32, 46. 
 77.  Id. at 45. 
 78.  Id. at 46. 
 79.  Id. at 17. 
 80.  Id. at 26. 
 81.  Id. at 28–29. 
 82.  Id. at 35–36. 
 83.  Id. at 41–42 
 84.  Id. at 38. Appellants also argue that the reports do not actually offer strong support for 
Appellees’ argument because the results did not consistently support a finding of racial 
predominance. Id. at 40. 
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establishing the same majority-minority district meant that they failed 
to meet their burden of proof that race predominated.85 
Appellees argue that the district court ruling finding both CD1 and 
CD12 were drawn with race as the predominant factor was not clear 
error.86 Appellees claim that the alternative map argument relied on by 
Appellants does not apply in cases where other evidence sufficiently 
supports a finding that race predominated.87 For both CD1 and CD12, 
Appellees offer support for the district court’s factual findings that 
supported the conclusion that race predominated. 
For CD1, Appellees rely on both direct and circumstantial evidence 
to support the ruling of the lower court, but depend most heavily on 
Dr. Hofeller’s testimony.88 According to Appellees, Dr. Hofeller’s 
admission that traditional redistricting criteria were subordinated to 
the goal of drawing CD1 as a majority-minority district qualified as 
strong direct evidence that race predominated.89 Appellees point to 
circumstantial evidence regarding the final shape and demographics of 
CD1 and the surrounding districts to support the direct evidence of 
racial predominance.90 
For CD12, Appellees again argue that both direct and 
circumstantial evidence support the district court’s finding of racial 
predominance.91 Disagreeing with Appellant’s interpretation, 
Appellees argue that the public statement by Senator Rucho and 
Representative Lewis strongly indicates that Guilford County was 
added to CD12 because that would make CD12 a majority-minority 
district.92 Additionally, Appellees argue that even though Dr. Hofeller 
was told to base districting decisions in CD12 on politics, he was also 
told that he should make an exception for Guilford County, and to add 
Guilford County to CD12 to meet the requirements of section 5 of the 
VRA.93 Appellees also point to circumstantial evidence from their 
experts, evidence  showing  that race  best explains  CD12’s  boundaries,  
 
 
 
 85.  Id. at 31. 
 86.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 4–5. 
 87.  Id. at 33. 
 88.  Id. at 12. 
 89.  Id. 
 90.  Id. at 14. 
 91.  Id. at 18, 22. 
 92.  Id. at 20. 
 93.  Id. 
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that they claim provides support for the district court’s finding that race 
predominated in CD12.94 
C.  Did the District Court Commit Clear Error by Holding CD1 and 
CD12 do not Survive Strict Scrutiny Review? 
There is no dispute regarding CD12—Appellants provide no 
argument that CD12 survives strict scrutiny—but Appellants 
vigorously contest the district court’s holding that CD1 does not 
survive strict scrutiny.95 Appellants argue the North Carolina 
legislature had good reasons to think section 2 of the VRA required 
CD1 to be drawn as a majority-minority district: the legislature 
received evidence that all the Gingles factors were met,96 and Bartlett 
requires the creation of majority-minority districts.97 Appellants point 
to studies and testimony the legislature received stating that racially 
polarized voting still happens in North Carolina’s CD1 as proof that 
the second and third Gingles factors were satisfied.98 Because 
Appellants argue that the correct interpretation of Bartlett requires the 
creation of majority-minority districts when all the Gingles factors are 
satisfied,99 they conclude that there was clearly good reason for the 
legislature to create CD1 as a majority-minority district.100 
Appellees argue that Appellants and the North Carolina state 
legislature have misinterpreted Bartlett,101 and that the evidence relied 
upon by the state legislature concerning racially polarized voting is not 
the proper evidence to rely on when analyzing the third Gingles 
precondition.102 Instead, argue Appellees, the legislature should have 
relied on actual electoral outcomes.103 According to Appellees, the 
actual electoral outcomes in the prior version of CD1 showed that the 
African-American minority had high levels of success in electing their 
candidates, despite not being a majority-minority district.104 Therefore, 
 
 94.  Id. at 28. 
 95.  Brief for Appellants, supra note 4, at 47. 
 96.  Id. at 53. 
 97.  Id. at 50. 
 98.  Id. at 53. The first Gingles factor was, as Appellants put it, obviously satisfied given that 
CD1 had at some point been a majority-minority district. Id. at 52. 
 99.  Id. at 45. 
 100.  Id. at 52. 
 101.  Brief for Appellees, supra note 16, at 50. 
 102.  See id. at 45 (“Consideration of past election results is the well-established means by 
which courts assess whether the third Gingles precondition is met.”). 
 103.  Id. at 40. 
 104.  Id. at 44. 
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the third Gingles factor was not satisfied, and the North Carolina 
legislature did not have good reason to believe it needed to make CD1 
a majority-minority district.105 
V.  ANALYSIS 
While the evidence in this case presented a challenge to the district 
court, the correct path for the Supreme Court is fairly clear. Appellants’ 
attempt to bar the case or modify the standard of review due to the 
state court litigation is unsupported by any court precedent. While it 
may seem somewhat arbitrary that the federal case happened to reach 
the court on its merits first, there is no exception in Rule 52(a), which 
states quite clearly that the standard of review of factual findings is for 
clear error.106 Since Appellees were not a party to the state court 
litigation, collateral estoppel cannot be applied, even though the case 
raises similar policy concerns.107 
The appropriate response to Appellants’ claim that Appellees must 
provide an alternative district map is similarly clear: no map should be 
required in this case. The Easley requirement that a party show 
alternative ways the “legislature could have achieved its legitimate 
political objectives”108 should not be interpreted to require a map. An 
alternative map could be one way to show racial predominance, but 
that does not make it the only way. In cases where other evidence is 
sufficient to show whether or not race was the predominant factor, a 
map requirement adds no value. Even in cases where an alternative 
map may arguably be necessary, there is nothing to stop a legislature 
from simply asserting that the proposed alternative map was politically 
infeasible or insufficient, regardless of the map. The Supreme Court 
should not overturn the district court ruling because of the lack of 
alternative district maps. 
The evidence that CD1 is an impermissible racial gerrymander is 
overwhelming. The person responsible for drawing CD1 admitted to 
subordinating traditional redistricting criteria to race,109 the very 
definition of racial predominance.110 Appellants’ attempt to justify 
 
 105.  Id. at 50. 
 106.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 52(a). 
 107.  See, e.g., Smith v. Bayer Corp., 564 U.S. 299, 316–17 (2011) (holding that nonparties 
being bound by prior court orders violates the rule against nonparty preclusion). 
 108.  Easley v. Cromartie, 532 U.S. 234, 258 (2001). 
 109.  Harris v. McCrory, 159 F. Supp. 3d 600, 612 (M.D.N.C. 2016). 
 110.  Miller v. Johnson, 515 U.S. 900, 916 (1995). 
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creating the gerrymander depended on interpreting Bartlett to require 
majority-minority districts when the Bartlett Court specifically warned 
against interpreting the case to require majority-minority districts.111 
The district court’s analysis of CD12 is not as overwhelmingly 
persuasive as for CD1, but because the standard of review is for clear 
error, the Supreme Court should affirm that CD12 is also an 
impermissible racial gerrymander. The most persuasive pieces of 
evidence supporting a finding that CD12 is an impermissible racial 
gerrymander are Senator Rucho’s statement saying the goal was to 
increase the BVAP in CD12 and the joint public statement made by 
Senator Rucho and Representative Lewis explaining the placement of 
Guilford County in CD12. Because Senator Rucho denies making the 
statement about CD12’s BVAP, the issue becomes whether the 
Supreme Court should accept the district court’s finding that the 
statement did in fact happen. Credibility determinations are a 
prerogative of the trial court, and “can virtually never be clear error.”112 
It is not clearly unreasonable to have credited this statement, especially 
given the joint public statement made about Guilford County. While 
the public statement could be interpreted to be describing the results 
of the redistricting or the motivation behind it, the district court’s 
interpretation is not obviously incorrect. Therefore, the Supreme Court 
should not overturn the district court’s conclusion that CD12 is an 
impermissible racial gerrymander. 
The Court will most likely uphold the findings of the lower court, 
but it is possible that the Court may overturn the finding of racial 
predominance in CD12. If it would apply anywhere in this case, the 
“alternative ways” requirement from Easley would apply to CD12. The 
Court could decide that an alternative district map should have been 
required for CD12 because the evidence was not overwhelmingly 
persuasive without such a map. Easley did not state exactly how 
persuasive or compelling the evidence of racial predominance would 
need to be before the alternative district map is no longer needed. The 
Court could decide to clarify that standard in a way that favored 
legislatures by requiring the map unless the other evidence is 
overwhelmingly persuasive. There is no precedent to support either a 
strict or loose interpretation, and so it is possible that it could go either 
way. But, given the policy arguments discussed above regarding the 
 
 111.  See Bartlett v. Strickland, 556 U.S. 1, 23 (2009) (“Our holding also should not be 
interpreted to entrench majority-minority districts by statutory command.”). 
 112.  Anderson v. Bessemer City, 470 U.S. 564, 575 (1985). 
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efficacy of the alternative district map, the Court should and likely will 
decide that an alternative map was not required to prove racial 
predominance in CD1 or CD12. 
CONCLUSION 
The Supreme Court should affirm the district court ruling that 
North Carolina’s CD1 and CD12 are the result of impermissible racial 
gerrymanders. Though Appellants argue that politics and the attempts 
to comply with the VRA justify the districts, the district courts findings 
and conclusions are not clearly erroneous, and therefore should not be 
overturned. North Carolina must remedy CD1 and CD12 of their 
unconstitutional racially gerrymandered boundaries. 
